

PROGRAMA DE ECONOMIA DO CRIME E DA VIOLÊNCIA-(398110)

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Período: 2º Semestre – 2022
Carga Horária: 60 horas (4 créditos)
Horário: Segundas-Feiras – 12 às 13 h50min da tarde
Quartas-Feiras – 12 às 13 h50min da manhã

ECONOMIA DO CRIME E DA VIOLÊNCIA

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INTRODUÇÃO

A criminalidade é um dos mais graves problemas que afligem as sociedades modernas. Cientistas Econômicos e Sociais de diferentes áreas procuram entender as causas, e as motivações, desse fenômeno, bem como possíveis alternativas de políticas públicas que possam minimizar seus efeitos. Entendendo criminalidade no sentido amplo, podemos interpretar corrupção, rupturas partidárias, comércio de votos, multas de trânsito, crimes

de ódio, homicídios, roubos, drogas, estupros, suicídios, terrorismo, abuso de autoridade, evasão de divisas, dirigir alcoolizado, pirataria, violência doméstica e no trabalho, colar em provas, ocupação dos estacionamentos públicos por food truck, não exercício do estado de direito, etc.

OBJETIVO

O principal objetivo do curso é tentar compreender melhor os determinantes dos diferentes tipos de crime e da violência. Cabe ressaltar que uma melhor compreensão da criminalidade é uma questão vital para a formulação de políticas públicas que tentem amenizar esse problema. É evidente que um objetivo de tal magnitude impõe diversas dificuldades a essa empreitada.

AVALIAÇÃO:

Os alunos serão convidados a apresentar seminários ao longo do curso. Tais seminários serão responsáveis por 30% da avaliação final. Os 70% restantes serão cobrados na forma de um artigo ao final do curso.

CONHECIMENTOS PRÉVIOS NECESSÁRIOS:

Para um desempenho satisfatório na disciplina, é desejável que os alunos já tenham feito curso de Teoria Econômica ao nível de Pós-graduação. Entretanto, essa não é uma condição "sine qua non".

PROGRAMA

1. Programa-Economia do Crime e da Violência
2. Os Primeiros Estudos do Crime.
3. O Enfoque Econômico do Crime.
- 3A. Tipos de Crimes Violentes.
- 3B. Tipos de Crimes Não -Violentes.
4. Oferta e Demanda de Crime.
5. Modelo Teórico do Crime de Gary Becker.
6. Métodos Econométricos Aplicados ao Crime.
7. Por que os Brasileiros se Envolvem tanto em Corrupção?
- 7.1. Análise Econômica dos Crimes: Notícias e Mídias.
8. Principais Estudos sobre Economia da Criminalidade.
- 8.1. Ehrlich, I. (1973). *Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation*.
- 8.2. Hamermesh and Soss (1974). *An Economic Theory of Suicide*.
- 8.3. Ehrlich, I. (1996). *Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses*.
- 8.4. Glaeser, E. L., Sacerdote, B. and Scheinkman, J. A. (1996). Crime and Social Interactions.
- 8.5. Glaeser, E. L. and Sacerdote, B. (1999). Why is There More Crime in Cities.
- 8.6. Donohue, J. J. Iii and Steven D. Levitt (2001). The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime.

8.7. Glaeser and Saks (2006). Corruption in America.

8.8. Mauro, Paolo (2006). Corruption and Growth.

9. ÁREAS DE ESTUDOS ECONÔMICOS DA CRIMINALIDADE

CRIMES VIOLENTOS(CV)

9.CV1. Homicídio, Estupros, Roubo s Tráfico de Drogas

9.CV2. Acidentes de Trânsito

9.CV3. Violência Doméstica e no Trabalho

9.CV4. Suicídio

9.CV5. Terrorismo

CRIMES NÃO-VIOLENTOS (CNV)

9.CNV6. Lavagem de Dinheiro e Corrupção

9.CNV7. Corrupção e Partidos Políticos

9.CNV8. Crime e Desigualdade de Renda

9.CNV9. Crime Ambiental

9.CV1. HOMICÍDIO, ROUBO, ESTUPRO E TRÁFICO DE DROGAS

Gil S. Epstein; Hillel Rapoport and Avi Weiss (1999). Drug addiction and the economic rationalization of gun control. *Economics Letters* 65 (1999) 55–57

Cherry, T. L. and J. A. List (2002). Aggregation bias in the economic model of crime. *Economics Letters* 75 (2002) 81–86.

Loureiro, P. R. A.; A. Sachsida; F. G. Carneiro (2006). *Crime and Social Interaction: A Developing Country Case Study*. (2005). *The Journal of Socio-Economics* (B1) october, Vol. 34, Issues 3 pp. 311-318.

L. Chiou and M. Lopez (2010). The reality of reality television: Does reality TV influence local crime rates? *Economics Letters* 108 (2010) 330–333.

W. A. Bartley (1999). Will rationing guns reduce crime? *Economics Letters* 62 (1999) 241–243.

R. A. Araujo and T. B. S. Moreira (2004). *A dynamic model of production and traffic of drugs*. *Economics Letters* 82 (2004) 371–376.

Loureiro, P.R.A.; Emilson S. Caputo (2011). *What Causes Intentional Homicide?* (2011). *Journal of International Development* (A1) jan 17 pp.1-17).

E. E. Patalinghug (2011). Crime rates and labor market opportunities in the Philippines: 1970–2008. *Economics Letters* 113 (2011) 160–164

J. E. Prieger and J. Kulick. Unintended consequences of enforcement in illicit markets. *Economics Letters* 125 (2014) 295–297.

9.CV2. ACIDENTES DE TRÂNSITO

P. McCarthy and W. K. Talley (1999). Evidence on risk compensation and safety behaviour. *Economics Letters* 62 (1999) 91–96.

T. S. Dee and Rebecca J. Sela (2003). The fatality effects of highway speed limits by gender and age. *Economics Letters* 79 (2003) 401–408.

M. Eliason and H. Ohlsson. Living to save taxes. *Economics Letters* 100 (2008) 340–343.
Loureiro, P.R.A.; Tito B. Moreira; A. Sachsida (2004). *Traffic Accidents: an econometrics investigation*. (2004) *Economics Bulletin* (A1) vol.18, No.3, pp.1-7.
V. Shrestha (2019). Cigarette prices and driving fatalities among youths. *Economics Letters* 184 (2019) 108589.

9.3. VIOLÊNCIA DOMÉSTICA E NO TRABALHO

Anna Aizer, Anna (2010). *The Gender Wage Gap and Domestic Violence*. *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 100, No. 4 (September 2010), pp. 1847-1859.
M. Malcolm and G. Dugda (2012). Child abuse: Does public enforcement crowd out private vigilance?. *Economics Letters* 114 (2012) 106–108.
Luca, D. L., Emily Owens and Gunjan Sharma (2015). *Can Alcohol Prohibition Reduce Violence Against Women?*. *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 105, No. 5, PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS.
C. Bredemeier; F. Juessen; R. Winkler (2017) Man-cessions, fiscal policy, and the gender composition of employment. *Economics Letters* Volume 158, September 2017, Pages 73-76.
Jeremy A. Cook and Timothy W. Taylor (2019). The impact of mandatory arrest laws on domestic violence in times of economic stress. *Economics Letters* 178 (2019) 77–81
J. A. Cook and T. W. Taylor (2019). The impact of mandatory arrest laws on domestic violence in times of economic stress. *Economics Letters* 178 (2019) 77–81.

9.4. SUICÍDIO

Durkheim, E. (1897/1951), *Suicide*. Routledge, London.
Hamermesh and Soss (1974). An Economic Theory of Suicide. *Journal of Political Economy*, 1974, vol. 82, issue 1, 83-98.
Loureiro, P. R. A.; Sachsida, A.; Moreira, T. B. (2015). *Does The Effect of Media Influence Suicide Rates?* (2015). *Journal of Economic Studies*. Issue 3, to Volume 42. pp.415-432.
N. Antonakakis and Alan Collins (2018). A suicidal Kuznets curve?. *Economics Letters* 166 (2018) 90–93.
C. Christian and L. Elbourne (2018). Shocks to military support and subsequent assassinations in Ancient Rome. *Economics Letters* 171 (2018) 79–82.
L. H. Kahane and P. Sannicandro (2019). The impact of 1998 Massachusetts gun laws on suicide: A synthetic control approach. *Economics Letters* 174 (2019) 104–108.
L. H-Velasco and A. S.-Murillo (2020). Do spouses negotiate in the shadow of the law? Evidence from unilateral divorce, suicides, and homicides in Mexico. *Economics Letters* 187 (2020) 108891.

9.CV5. TERRORISMO

Rafael Di Tella and Ernesto Schargrodsky (2004). Do Police Reduce Crime? Estimates Using the Allocation of Police Forces after a Terrorist Attack. *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 94, No. 1 (Mar., 2004), pp. 115-133.
A. Dreher and M. Gassebner (2008). Does political proximity to the U.S. cause terror? *Economics Letters* 99 (2008) 27–29.
M. Gassebner; R. Jong-A-Pin; J. O. Mierau(2008). Terrorism and electoral accountability:

One strike, you're out!. Economics Letters 100 (2008) 126–129.

A. Dreher; T. Krieger ; Daniel Meierrieks (2011). Hit and (they will) run: The impact of terrorism on migration. Economics Letters 113 (2011) 42–46.

S. Schüller (2015). The 9/11 conservative shift. Economics Letters 135 (2015) 80-84.

9.CNV6. LAVAGEM DE DINHEIRO E CORRUPÇÃO

Araujo, R. (2009a). Are labor contract efficient to combat crime?. Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 16 No. 3, pp. 255-61.

Araujo, Ricardo A. (2008). Assessing the efficiency of the anti-money laundering regulation: an incentive-based approach. Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 11 No. 1, pp. 67-75.

Ardizzi, Guerino; Pierpaolo De Franceschis, Michele Giammatteo (2018). Cash payment anomalies and money laundering: An econometric analysis of Italian municipalities. International Review of Law and Economics 56 (2018) 105–121.

Loureiro. PRAL; Ricardo A. Araujo; Tito B. Moreira (2015). The Economic Foundations of Anti-Money laundering Regulation. Economic Analysis of Law Review. (B2) T. B. Vol. 6 N. 2. p.322-332

Loureiro. PRAL; Tito B. Moreira; A. Sachsida (2012). *A Dynamic Model of Organized Crime and Money Laundering*. Economics and Finance Review (B5) vol. 1, N^o 11 January, pp.42-47.

Masciandaro, D. (1999). Money laundering: the economics of regulation. European Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 7, pp. 225-40.

Tito B. S. Moreira, 2007. A Two-Period Model of Money Laundering and Organized Crime. Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 11(3), pages 1-5.

9.CNV7. CORRUPÇÃO E PARTIDOS POLÍTICOS

Raymond Surette (1985). Crimes, Arrests, and Elections: Predicting Winners and Losers. Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 13. pp. 321-327 (1985).

S. K. Chowdhury. The effect of democracy and press freedom on corruption: an empirical test. Economics Letters 85 (2004) 93–101.

Ming-Jen Lin (2007). *Does democracy increase crime? The evidence from international data*. Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (2007) 467–483.

Loureiro, P.R. A.; Moreira, Tito. B.; Ellery, Roberto (2017). *The Relationship between Political Parties and Tolerance to Criminality: a Theoretical Model and Empirical Evidences for Brazil*. (2017). International Journal of Social Economics. Volume 44 Issue 12.(pp. 1871 - 1891). 4 December 2017.

Loureiro, P.R. A.; Junior, A. N; Ellery, R. G. Jr. ; Moreira, T. B(2018). *Does Political Party in Government Increase Intentional Homicide in Brazil?*. Review of Development Economics 2018;22:706–726.

M. C. Lehmann and Hellen Matarazzo (2019). Voters' response to in-kind transfers: Quasi-experimental evidence from prescription drug cost-sharing in Brazil. Economics Letters 184 (2019) 108614.

9.CNV8. CRIME E DESIGUALDADE DE RENDA

- Brush, Jesse (2007). Does income inequality lead to more crime? A comparison of cross-sectional and time-series analyses of United States counties. *Economics Letters* 96 (2007) 264–268.
- Fajnzylber P, Lederman D, Loayza N. (2002). What causes violent crime? *European Economic Review* 46: 1323–1357.
- Jongmook Choe (2008). Income inequality and crime in the United States. *Economics Letters* 101 (2008) 31–33.
- Luiz Guilherme Scorzafave and Milena Karla Soares (2009). Income inequality and pecuniary crimes. *Economics Letters* 104 (2009) 40–42.
- Loureiro, P.R. L; A. Sachsida; Mario J. C. de Mendonça (2009). *Inequality and Criminality Revisited: further evidence from Brazil*. (2009) *Empirical Economics* (A1) vol.39 No 1 pp.93-109 [with Maria B. S. Gutierrez (OECD)].
- Loureiro, P.R. A.; Emilson S. Caputo (2011). *What Causes Intentional Homicide? (2011)*. *Journal of International Development* (A1) jan 17 pp.1-17).
- P. Chintrakarn and D. Herzer (2012). More inequality, more crime? A panel cointegration analysis for the United States. *Economics Letters* 116 (2012) 389–391. Scorzafave. L. Guilherme; Milena Karla Soares (2009). Income inequality and pecuniary crimes. *Economics Letters* 104 (2009) 40–42.
- T. Menezes; R. S. Neto; C. Monteiro; J. L. Ratton (2013). Spatial correlation between homicide rates and inequality: Evidence from urban neighborhoods. *Economics Letters* 120 (2013) 97–99.

9.CNV. CRIME AMBIENTAL

- Grolleaua, Gilles; Lisette Ibanezb; Naoufel Mzoughic (2020). Moral judgment of environmental harm caused by a single versus multiple wrongdoers: A survey experiment. *Ecological Economics* 170 (2020) 106586
- Hayashi, Takashi (2015). Measuring rural–urban disparity with the Genuine Progress Indicator: A case study in Japan. *Ecological Economics* 120 (2015) 260–271
- Hitaja; Claudia; Lori Lyncha; Kenneth E. McConnellb; Constant I. Tra (2018). The Value of Ozone Air Quality Improvements to Renters: Evidence From Apartment Building Transactions in Los Angeles County. *Ecological Economics*. Volume 146, April 2018, Pages 706-721
- Klassen, Mark; Brandon P. Anthony (2019). The effects of recreational cannabis legalization on forest management and conservation efforts in U.S. national forests in the Pacific Northwest. *Ecological Economics* 162 (2019) 39–48 Loureiro, P.R.A.; Mario J. C. de Mendonça; A. Sachsida (2003). *A Study on the Valuing of Biodiversity: the case of three endangered species in Brazil*. (2003) *Ecological Economics* vol. 46 No 1 pp.9-18 August.
- Loureiro, P.R.A.; Mario J. C. de Mendonça; A. Sachsida (2006). Estimation of Damage to Human Health due to Forest Burning in the Amazon. (2006) *Journal of Population Economics* vol.19 No3 pp.593-610 March.

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Economic Approach to Human Behavior. New edition University of Chicago Press.
Bruce L. Benson (Editor) (2010). Paul R. Zimmerman (Editor). *Handbook on the Economics of Crime*. Novembro 2010
Gianluca Fiorentini (Editor), Sam Peltzman (Editor) (1997). *The Economics of Organised Crime*. Editora : Cambridge University Press; Reprint edição (14 agosto 1997) Harold Winter (2019). *The Economics of Crime: An Introduction to Rational Crime Analysis*. Editora : Routledge; 2ª edição (14 agosto 2019) Madjd-Sadjadi, Zagros (2013). *The Economics of Crime*. Editora: Business Expert Press.
Joyce Lee Malcolm (2014). *Violência e Armas*. Editora: Vide Editorial Ano: 2014
Varian Hal, Hal (2015) *Microeconomia*. Editora: Elsevier