

Economia da Educação

1º semestre de 2021 - Pós-Graduação em Economia

Sextas de 14:00 às 18:00

14:00 às 16:00 → aulas assíncronas.

16:00 às 18:00 → Equipe “Economia da Educação” no Microsoft Teams.

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página pessoal: <https://sites.google.com/site/rflterra>

1 Objetivos do Curso

Este curso abrange tópicos em Economia da Educação por meio de leitura e discussão de papers na área. Tópicos específicos incluem retornos salariais à educação, efeitos de pares (peer effects), qualidade dos professores, escolha da escola, vouchers, charter schools, contratos e incentivos financeiros aos professores. Além dos tópicos, serão discutidas as metodologias de estimação usadas. A exposição dos papers principais serão feitas em aulas gravadas pelo professor e a discussão e apresentação dos demais papers serão realizadas em encontros síncronos às sextas-feiras de 16:00 às 18:00.

2 Pré-requisitos

Alunos com bom *background* em técnicas microeconóméticas terão maior facilidade para lerem os papers.

3 Leituras

Os textos a serem discutidos em cada aula encontram-se na seção de conteúdo.

4 Seminários

As datas e os textos dos seminários encontram-se na seção de conteúdo. A cada sexta-feira teremos um ou dois seminários. Enquanto o aluno apresenta seu seminário, o aluno que apresentará o próximo seminário faz intervenções com questionamentos e colocações sobre o texto.

O número de exposições que cada aluno fará ao longo do semestre dependerá do número de alunos.

Os textos a serem expostos (e discutidos) em aula pelo professor estão destacados com o símbolo ♣, enquanto os textos a serem expostos (e discutidos) em aula pelos alunos estão destacados pelo símbolo ♦.

5 Conteúdo

1. Aula 23/07: Revisão de Econometria

2. Aula 30/07: Retornos salariais à Educação Básica

- ♣ Angrist, J.; Krueger, A. (1991) Does Compulsory School Attendance Affect Schooling and Earnings? *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 106, No. 4, pp. 979-1014.
- ♣ Oreopoulos, P. (2006) Estimating Average and Local Average Treatment Effects of Education When Compulsory Schooling Laws Really Matter. *American Economic Review*, vol. 96, n. 1, pp. 152-175.
- ◊ Clark, D.; Martorell, P. (2014) The signaling value of a high school diploma. *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 122, n.2, pp. 282-318.
- ◊ Chetty, R.; Friedman, J.N.; Hilger, N.; Saez, E.; Schanzenbach, D.W.; Yagan, D. (2011) How Does Your Kindergarten Classroom Affect Your Earnings? Evidence from Project STAR, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
- ◊ Chetty, R.; Friedman, J.N.; Rockoff, J.E. (2014) Measuring the Impacts of Teachers II: Teacher Value-Added and Student Outcomes in Adulthood. *American Economic Review*, 104, n.9, pp. 2633-2679.
- Card, D. (2001). Estimating the Return to Schooling: Progress on Some Persistent Econometric Problems. *Econometrica*, vol.69, n.5.

3. Aula 06/08: Retornos salariais à Educação Superior

- ♣ Behrman, J.; Rozenzweig, M.; Taubman, P. (1996). College Choice and Wages: Estimates Using Data on Female Twins. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. 78, pp.672-685.
- ♣ Dale, S.B.; Krueger, A. (2002). Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More Selective College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 117, n.4, pp. 1491-1527.
- ◊ Kirkeboen, L.; Leuven, E.; Mogstad, M. (2016) Field of Study, Earnings, and Self-Selection. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. vol. 131, n.3.
- ◊ Hoekstra, M. (2009) The Effect of Attending the State Flagship University on Earnings: A Discontinuity-Based Approach. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. 91, n.4, pp. 717-724.
- ◊ Zimmerman, S. (2014) The returns to college admission for academically marginal students. *Journal of Labor Economics*, vol. 32, n.4, pp. 711-754.
- Hoxby, C. (2015). Computing the Value-Added of American Postsecondary Institutions. <https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15rpcompvalueaddpostsecondary>.

pdf

4. Aula 13/08: Dinheiro importa? (Insumos escolares)

- ♣ Card, D.; Krueger, A. (1996). School Resources and Student Outcomes: An Overview of the Literature and New evidence from North and South Carolina. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*. vol. 10, n.4, pp.31-50.
- ♣ Hanushek, E. A. (2003). The Failure of Input-Based Schooling Policies. *Economic Journal*, vol.113, n. 485, pp.64-98.
- ◊ Card, D.; Payne, A. (2002). School Finance Reform, the Distribution of School Spending, and the Distribution of Student Test Scores. *Journal of Public Economics*, vol.83, pp.49-82.
- ◊ Papke, L. (2005) The effects of spending on test pass rates: evidence from Michigan, *Journal of Public Economics*. vol.89, n.5-6, pp. 821-839.
- ◊ Das, J.; Dercon, S.; Habyarimana, J.; Krishnan, P.; Muralidharan, K.; Sundararaman, V. (2013).School Inputs, Household Substitution, and Test Scores. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, American Economic Association, vol. 5, n.2, pp. 29-57.

5. Aula 20/08: O Efeito da Qualidade do Professor

- ♣ Hanushek, E.A.; Kain, J.F.; Rivkin, S.G. (2005). The Market for Teacher Quality NBER conference paper. NBER Working Paper n. 11154.
- ♣ Corcoran,S.; Evans, W.; Schwab, R. (2004). Changing Labor Market Opportunities for Women and the Quality of Teachers 1957-1992, *American Economic Review*: P & P. Vol 94, n.2, pp. 230-235.
- ♣ Angrist, J.; Guryan, J. (2004). Teacher Testing, Teacher Education, and Teacher Characteristics. *American Economic Review*: P & P. Vol 94, n.2, pp. 241-246.
- ◊ Kane, T.; Staiger, D.; Cantrell, S.; Fullerton, J. (2007). National Board Certification and Teacher Effectiveness: Evidence from a Random Assignment Experiment NBER conference paper.
- ◊ Taylor, E. S.; Tyler, J.H. (2012). The Effect of Evaluation on Teacher Performance. *American Economic Review*, vol. 102, n.7, pp.3628-51.
- Guarino, C. M.; Reckase, M.D.; Wooldridge, J.M. (2012). Can Value Added Measures of Teacher Performance be Trusted? *Education Policy Center Working Paper* n.18. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University (May).

6. Aula 27/08: Incentivos financeiros aos professores

- ♣ Lavy, V. (2009). Performance Pay and Teachers' Effort, Productivity and Grading Ethics. *American Economic Review*, vol.99, n.5, pp. 1979-2021.

- ♣ Fryer, Jr, R.G.; Levitt, S.D.; List; J.; Sadoff, S. (2012). Enhancing the efficacy of teacher incentives through loss aversion: A field experiment. NBER Working Paper No. w18237.
- ◊ Muralidharan, K.; Sundararaman, V. (2011). Teacher Performance Pay: Evidence from India. *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol.119, n.1, pp. 39 - 77.
- ◊ Glewwe, P.; Ilias, N.; Kremer, M. (2010) Teacher Incentives. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, Vol. 2, pp. 205-227.
- ◊ Imberman, S. A.; Lovenheim, M.F. (2015) Incentive strength and teacher productivity: evidence from a group-based teacher incentive pay system. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 97, n.2, pp. 364-386.
- Dee, T.S.; Wyckoff, J (2015). Incentives, selection, and teacher performance: Evidence from IMPACT. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*. Vol.34, n.2, pp. 267-297.
- Fryer, R.G. (2013). Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from New York City Public Schools. *Journal of Labor Economics*. Vol.31, n.2, pp. 373-407.
- Duflo, E.; Hanna,R.; Ryan, S.P. (2012). Incentives Work: Getting teachers to come to school. *American Economic Review*, vol.102, n.4, pp.1241-1278.
- Lavy, V. (2002). Evaluating the effect of teacher's group performance incentives on pupil achievement. *The Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 110, n.6.
- de Ree, J.; Muralidharan, K.; Pradhan, M.; Rogers, H. (2015). Double for Nothing? Experimental Evidence on the Impact of an Unconditional Teacher Salary Increase on Student Performance in Indonesia, NBER Working Papers 21806, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Figlio, D. N. ; Kenny, L. W.(2007). Individual Teacher Incentives and Student Performance. *Journal of Public Economics*, vol.91, pp. 901-914.

7. Aula 03/09: Contratos dos Professores

- ♣ Hoxby, C. (1996). How teachers' union affect education production. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 111, n.3.
- ♣ Duflo, E.; Dupas, P.; Cremer, M. (2015) School governance, teacher incentives, and pupil-teacher ratios: Experimental evidence from Kenyan primary schools. *Journal of Public Economics*, vol. 123, pp. 92-110.
- ◊ Figlio, D.N.; Schapiro, M.O.; Soter, K.B. (2015). Are Tenure Track Professors Better Teachers? *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. 92, n.4, pp.1-10.
- ◊ Bold, Tessa; Kimenyi, Mwangi; Mwabub, Germano; Ng'ang'a, Alice; Sandefur, Justin. (2018). Experimental evidence on scaling up education reforms in Kenya. *Journal of Public Economics*, 168, 1-20.

8. Aula 10/09: Tecnologia da Informação

- ♣ Escueta, M.; Quan, V.; Nickow, A.J.; Oreopoulos, P. (2017). Education Technology: An Evidence-Based Review. National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper Series. N.23744.
- ◊ Muralidharan, K.; Singh, A.; Ganimian, A.J. (2017). Disrupting Education? Experimental Evidence on Technology-Aided Instruction in India, CESifo Working Paper Series 6328, CESifo Group Munich.
- ◊ Machin, S.; McNally, S.; Silva, O. (2007) New Technology in Schools: Is There a Payoff? *Economic Journal*, v. 117, n. 522, p. 1145-1167.
- ◊ Goolsbee, A.; Guryan, J. (2006) The Impact of Internet Subsidies in Public Schools. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, v. 88, n. 2, pp. 336-347.
- ◊ Oreopoulos, P.; Petronijevic, U. (2017). Student Coaching: How Far Can Technology Go? *Journal of Human Resources*, vol. 17, pp.1-50; published ahead of print.
- Oreopoulos, P.; Dunn, R. (2013). Information and College Access: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment. *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, vol. 115, n.1, pp. 3-26.
- Angrist, J.; Lavy, V. (2002). New Evidence on Classroom Computers and Pupil Learning. *Economic Journal*, vol. 112, n. 482, pp. 735-765.
- Banerjee, A.; Cole, S.; Duflo, E.; Linden, L. (2007). Remedyng Education: Evidence from Two Randomized Experiments in India. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 122, n.3, p. 1235-1264.
- Castleman, B. L.; Page, L. C. (2017) Parental Influences on Postsecondary Decision Making: Evidence from a Text Messaging Experiment. *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis*, vol. 39, n. 2, pp. 1-17.
- Fairlie, R. W.; Robinson, J. (2013a) Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Home Computers on Academic Achievement among Schoolchildren. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, vol. 5, n. 3, pp. 211-240.
- Malamud, O.; Pop-Eleches, C. (2011). Home Computer Use and the Development of Human Capital. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 126 n. 2, pp. 987-1027.
- Murnane, R. J.; Ganimian, A. J. (2014). Improving Educational Outcomes in Developing Countries: Lessons from Rigorous Evaluations. NBER Working Paper Series, v. 20284, pp. 59.
- Schmitta, J.; Wadsworth, J. (2006) Is there an impact of household computer ownership on children's educational attainment in Britain? *Economics of Education Review*, vol. 25, n. 6, pp. 659-673.

Spiezia, V. (2010) Does Computer Use Increase Educational Achievements? Student-level Evidence from PISA. OECD Journal: Economic Studies, vol. 2010, n. 1, pp. 1-22.

9. Aula 17/09: Efeitos dos pares (Peer Effects) e Divisão de Turmas por Desempenho (Tracking)

- ♣ Duflo, E.; Dupas, P.; Kremer, M. (2011). Peer Effects and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Kenya. *American Economic Review*, Vol. 101, n.5.
- ♣ Carrell, S. E.; Sacerdote, B. I.; West, J.E. (2013) From natural variation to optimal policy? The importance of endogenous peer group formation. *Econometrica*. vol.81, n.3, pp. 855-882.
- ◊ Angrist, J.; Lang, K. (2004). Does Schooling Integration Generate Peer Effects? Evidence from Boston's Metco Program. *American Economic Review*, Vol. 94, n.5, pp. 1613-1634.
- ◊ Kling, J.R.; Liebmam, J. B.; Katz,L. F. (2007) Experimental analysis of neighborhood effects. *Econometrica*, vol. 75, n. 1, pp. 83-119.
- ◊ Carrell, S.; Hoekstra, M. (2010). Externalities in the Classroom: How Children Exposed to Domestic Violence Affect Everyone's Kids. *American Economic Journal - Applied Economics*, Vol. 2, n.1, pp. 211-228.
- Imberman, S.; Kugler, A.; Sacerdote, B. (2012). Katrina's Children: Evidence on the Structure of Peer Effects from Hurricane Evacuees *American Economic Review*. vol. 102, n. 5.

10. Aula 24/09: Habilidades não-cognitivas

- ♣ Santos, D; Primi, Ricardo. (2013). Social and emotional development and school learning: A measurement proposal in support of public policy. Research Report.
- ◊ Heckman, J. (2007). The Economics, Technology and Neuroscience of Human Capability Formation. NBER Working Paper 13195.
- ◊ Ponczek, V.; Xavier, C.P. (2017) The Building Blocks of Skill Development. 39º Meeting of the Brazilian Econometric Society.
- ◊ Heckman, J.; Stixrud, J.; Urzua, S. (2006). The Effects of Cognitive and Noncognitive Abilities on Labor Market Outcomes and Social Behavior. *Journal of Labor Economics*, vol. 24, n. 3.

11. Aula 01/10: Escolha da Escola e Qualidade da Escola

- ♣ Cullen, J. B.; Jacob, B.; Levitt, S. (2006). The Effect of School Choice on Participants: Evidence from Randomized Lotteries. *Econometrica*, vol. 74, n.5, pp. 1191-1230.

- ◊ Hastings, J. S.; Weinstein, J. M. (2008). Information, School Choice, and Academic Achievement: Evidence from Two Experiments. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 123, n.4, pp. 1373-1414.
- ◊ Deming, D. J. (2011). Better Schools, Less Crime? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol.126, n.4, pp. 2063-2115.
- ◊ Deming, D.J.; Hastings, J.; Kane, T.; Staiger, D. (2014) School Choice, School Quality, and Postsecondary Attainment. *American Economic Review*, vol. 104, n.3, pp. 991-1013.

12. Aula 08/10: Vouchers e escolas privadas

- ♣ Peterson, P. (2003). School Vouchers: Results from Randomized Experiments, in C. Hoxby, ed. *The Economics of School Choice*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- ◊ Abdulkadiroglu, A.; Pathak, P.A.; Walters, C.R. (2018). Free to Choose: Can School Choice Reduce Student Achievement? *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, Vol. 10, n.1, pp. 175-206.
- ◊ Angrist, J.; Bettinger, E.; Bloom, E.; King, E.; Kremer, M. (2001). Vouchers for Private Schooling in Colombia: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment, *American Economic Review*, vol.92, n.5.
- ◊ Neal, D. (1997). The Effects of Catholic Secondary Schooling on Educational Achievement. *Journal of Labor Economics*. Vol. 15, n.1, pp. 98-123.

13. Aula 22/10: Charter Schools

- ♣ Abdulkadiroglu, A.; Angrist, J.; Dynarski, S.; Kane, T.; Pathak, P. (2011). Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters and Pilots. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol.126, pp. 699-748.
- ♣ Angrist, J. D., Pathak, P. A.; Walters, C.R. (2013). Explaining Charter School Effectiveness. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, vol. 5, n.4, pp. 1-27.
- ◊ Booker, K.; Sass, T.R.; Gill, B.; Zimmer, R. (2011) The Effects of Charter High Schools on Educational Attainment. *Journal of Labor Economics*, vol. 29, n.2, pp. 377-415.
- ◊ Imberman, S. A. (2011). The Effect of Charter Schools on Achievement and Behavior of Public School Students. *Journal of Public Economics*, vol. 95, n.7/8, pp. 850-863.

14. Aula 29/10: Accountability

- ♣ Rockoff, J.; Turner, L.J. (2010). Short-Run Impacts of Accountability on School Quality. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, vol. 2, n.4, pp. 119-47.

- ◊ West, Martin R., and Paul E. Peterson. (2006). The efficacy of choice threats within school accountability systems: Results from legislatively induced experiments. *The Economic Journal*, vol. 116, n.510, pp. C46-C62.
- ◊ Deming, D. J.; Cohodes, S.; Jennings, J.; Jencks, C. (2016). School accountability, postsecondary attainment and earnings. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. , n. .
- ◊ Neal, D.; Schanzenbach, D.W. (2010). Left behind by design: Proficiency counts and test-based accountability. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. 92, n.2, pp. 263-283.
- ◊ Rouse, C. E.; (2013). Feeling the Florida heat? How low-performing schools respond to voucher and accountability pressure. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, vol.5, n.2, pp.251-281.
- ◊ Figlio, D.; Lucas, M.E. (2004). What's in a Grade? School Report Cards and the Housing Market. *American Economic Review*, vol. 94, pp. 591-604.

6 Avaliação

A avaliação será essencialmente baseada em participação e discussões em sala de aula, apresentação das leituras, e um diagnóstico ou projeto final.

1. Seminários (40% da nota): A cada semana - além dos papers apresentados pelo professor - vamos discutir um (ou dois) paper(s) (dependendo do número de alunos) apresentado(s) por um (ou dois) aluno(s).
2. Resumo (20% da nota) (mínimo de 15 resumos ou 0 no quesito): Os alunos devem apresentar texto escrito do resumo dos papers discutidos em vídeo pelo Professor. No resumo deverá constar o 1) Objetivo, 2) Relevância do assunto, 3) Descrever a metodologia , 4) Descrever as estatísticas descritivas e os resultados econométricos com foco nos resultados mais relevantes do estudo, 5) Discussão (inclusive com a opinião do aluno e com o suporte da literatura) da política estudada para a Educação em geral e para o Brasil em específico tendo os resultados do paper como base. Entrega até 14 dias depois da aula correspondente.
3. Diagnóstico ou Projeto de pesquisa (40% da nota) (*Entrega 05/11 e 12/11*): Como avaliação final, os alunos escreverão e apresentarão um diagnóstico de um tema sobre Educação a ser aprovado pelo professor, e pode incluir temas abordados ou não em sala. Alternativamente, o aluno poderá escrever um projeto, que pode consistir em um survey da literatura sobre um tópico, uma proposta de replicação de um estudo internacional para o caso do Brasil, ou um paper original.

7 Diretrizes para o bom andamento do curso online

Os alunos devem seguir algumas diretrizes :

Recomenda-se que os alunos assistam os videos gravados pelo professor com antecedência à reunião marcada.

Os primeiros 30 minutos da aula serão usados para tirar dúvidas, ouvir comentários e discutir o tema.

Os alunos devem colocar os microfones em mudo, ativando-os quando se manifestarem.

Recomenda-se deixar a câmera ligada, a não ser que atrapalhe a qualidade da chamada.

A não apresentação de seminários na data combinada, sem aviso ao professor com antecedência de sete dias, será penalizada com uma nota zero no quesito “Apresentação das leituras”.

Todos os integrantes da reunião devem ser tolerantes com opiniões diversas e se comportarem de forma respeitosa em geral.