

ECONOMIA DO SETOR PÚBLICO II

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[versão: March 23, 2022]

Este curso expõe evidência empírica para teorias econômicas do setor público. Meu objetivo é mostrar a fronteira de pesquisa e padrões de qualidade em top revistas internacionais, e de dotar você com um conjunto de ferramentas empíricas de investigação comuns à área — conhecimento que possa inspirar/melhorar sua dissertação de mestrado/doutorado.

Avaliação

Itens de avaliação e peso na nota final:

- Três pareceres acadêmicos (60%)
- Um projeto econométrico (40%)

Detalhes:

- Três pareceres acadêmicos:
 - Pareceres são uma parte fundamental da vida acadêmica. Se você submete um artigo, o editor da revista vai pedir para outros pesquisadores de escrever um parecer. Baseado nestes pareceres, o editor rejeita ou aceita o artigo.
 - Cada parecer deve ser de até (e cerca de) três páginas com espaçamento simples
 - O parecer deve começar com um curto parágrafo (máximo 1/3 da primeira página) de resumo do artigo. Em seguida, deve apresentar as principais críticas do artigo. O parecer deve concluir com comentários de menor relevância. Um bom parecer não somente ressalta claramente as deficiências do artigo, mas também oferece sugestões construtivas, detalhadas e realistas para sua melhoria. [Clique aqui para mais informações sobre como escrever um bom parecer](#)
 - Cada parecer deve ser preparado em \LaTeX
- Um projeto econométrico:
 - Você deve replicar os resultados de um dos artigos da ementa
 - Acesse o site da revista acadêmica onde o artigo foi publicado e baixe os dados e o do-file do artigo (por favor, não entre em contato com autores antes de conversar conmigo)
 - Primeiro, no do-file dos autores, faz comentários descrevendo o código dos autores com suas próprias palavras

- Segundo, roda o do-file para ver se ele replica os resultados do artigo. No fim do do-file faz um comentário dizendo se você conseguiu replicar ou não.
- Terceiro, faz uma extensão. Isso pode ser:
 - * um teste de robustez: Por exemplo, você poderia incluir mais alguma variável de controle na regressão para ver se isso muda as conclusões do artigo; ou excluir observações com valores muito grandes para ver se as conclusões do artigo dependem dessas observações; ou adicionar um termo quadrático da principal variável explicativa, para testar se a relação entre X e Y é não-linear.
 - * estimar regressões quantílicas (*quantile regressions*)
 - * estimar efeitos heterogêneos (*heterogenous effects*), ou seja, ver se a magnitude do efeito de X sobre Y depende de uma outra variável Z.
 - * alguma outra extensão que você acha interessante (mas conversa comigo antes)
- Se você não tiver acesso ao STATA, use R, Python ou qualquer outro programa open-source.

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1 Determinantes do comportamento de políticos

1.1 Competição eleitoral

- Ferreira, F., and Gyourko, J. (2009). Do political parties matter? Evidence from US cities. *The Quarterly journal of economics*, 124(1), 399-422.
- Husted and Kenny (1997), “The effects of the expansion of the voting franchise on the size of government”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 105, 1997, pp. 54-81.
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1.2 Ideologia

- Pettersson-Lidbom, Per (2008), ”Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes: A Regression-Discontinuity Approach,” *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 6(5), pp. 1037–1056.
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- Chattopadhyay, R. and E. Duflo (2004), ”Women as policy makers: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in India”, *Econometrica*, 72, pp. 1409-1443.
- Brollo & Troiano (2014) What Happens When a Woman Wins an Election? Evidence from Close Races in Brazil, *Journal of Development Economics*

1.3 Eleições próximas

- Sakurai, Sergio Naruhiko, and Naercio Menezes-Filho. "Opportunistic and partisan election cycles in Brazil: new evidence at the municipal level." *Public Choice* 148.1-2 (2011): 233-247
- Akhmedov, A., and Zhuravskaya, E. (2004), "Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(4), pp. 1301-1338.
- Brender, A. & Drazen, A. "Political Budget Cycles in New versus Established Democracies", *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2005.
- Janků, J., and Libich, J. (2019). Ignorance isn't bliss: Uninformed voters drive budget cycles. *Journal of Public Economics*, 173, 21-43.
- Alt, J. E., & Lassen, D. D. (2006). Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(3), 530-550.
- Bostashvili, D., and Ujhelyi, G. (2019). Political budget cycles and the civil service: Evidence from highway spending in US states. *Journal of public economics*, 175, 17-28.

1.4 Regras fiscais

- Grembi, V., Nannicini, T., and Troiano, U. (2016). Do fiscal rules matter?. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 1-30.

1.5 A mídia

- Eisensee, T. and D. Stromberg (2007), "News Droughts, News Floods and U.S. Disaster Relief," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
- Stromberg, David (2004) "Radio's Impact on Public Spending", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
- Larreguy & Monteiro (2013) The role of media networks in compensating political biases: evidence from radio networks in Brazil, Mimeo Harvard
- Di Tella, Rafael, and Ignacio Franceschelli (2011), "Government Advertising and Media Coverage of Corruption Scandals." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3(4), pp. 119-51.

1.6 Duração do mandato/Limites de mandatos

Duração do mandato:

- Dal Bó, Ernesto and Martin Rossi (2011), "Term Length and the Effort of Politicians", *Review of Economic Studies*, 78, pp.1237-1263.

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- De Janvry, A., Finan, F., & Sadoulet, E. (2012). Local electoral incentives and decentralized program performance. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 94(3), 672-685.
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2 Determinantes do comportamento de eleitores

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- Kendall, C., Nannicini, T., & Trebbi, F. (2015). How Do Voters Respond to Information? Evidence from a Randomized Campaign. *American Economic Review*, 105(1), 322-53.
- Gerber, A. S., Kessler, D. P., and Meredith, M. (2011). The persuasive effects of direct mail: A regression discontinuity based approach. *The Journal of Politics*, 73(1), 140-155.
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- Figueiredo, Hidalgo, Kasahara (2014) When Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from Brazil, unpublished manuscript

2.2 A mídia

(a) *turnout*:

- Gentzkow, Matthew, Jesse Shapiro and Michael Sinkinson (2010), “The Effect of Newspaper Entry and Exit on Electoral Politics”, *American Economic Review*, 101(7), pp. 2980-3018.
- Gentzkow, M. (2006). Television and voter turnout. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 931-972.
- Falck, O., Gold, R., & Heblich, S. (2014). E-elections: Voting behavior and the internet. *The American Economic Review*, 104(7), 2238-2265.

(b) *vote shares*:

- DellaVigna, S. and E. Kaplan (2007), “The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
- Enikolopov, R., M. Petrova and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2010), “Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia”, *American Economic Review*, 101(7), pp. 3253-85.
- Boas, T. C., and Hidalgo, F. D. (2011). Controlling the airwaves: Incumbency advantage and community radio in Brazil. *American Journal of Political Science*
- Durante, Ruben and Brian Knight (2009), “Partisan Control, Media Bias, and Viewer Responses: Evidence from Berlusconi’s Italy”, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 10(3), pp. 451-481.

2.3 *Pork*

- Levitt, S. D., & Snyder Jr, J. M. (1997). The impact of federal spending on House election outcomes. *Journal of political Economy*, 105(1), 30-53.
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- Sakurai, Sergio Naruhiko, and Naercio Aquino Menezes-Filho. “Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities.” *Public Choice* 137.1-2 (2008): 301-314.
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- Zucco, C. (2013). When payouts pay off: Conditional cash transfers and voting behavior in Brazil 2002–10. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(4), 810-822.
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- Frey, A. (2019). Cash transfers, clientelism, and political enfranchisement: Evidence from Brazil. *Journal of Public Economics*, 176, 1-17.

2.5 *Timing*

- Galiani, S., Hajj, N., McEwan, P. J., Ibararán, P., & Krishnaswamy, N. (2019). Voter Response to Peak and End Transfers: Evidence from a Conditional Cash Transfer Experiment. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 11(3), 232-60.

2.6 *Incumbency and Runner-up Effects*

- Freier, R. (2015). The mayor’s advantage: Causal evidence on incumbency effects in German mayoral elections. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 40, 16-30.
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2.7 *Voto compulsório*

- de Leon, L., Leite, F., and Rizzi, R. (2014). A test for the rational ignorance hypothesis: Evidence from a natural experiment in Brazil. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 6(4), 380-98.

3 *Seleção política*

- Dal Bó, E., Dal Bó, P., & Snyder, J. (2009). Political dynasties. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 76(1), 115-142.
- Pablo Querubin (2016), Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippines, *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*
- Braganca, A., Ferraz, C., & Rios, J. (2015). Political dynasties and the quality of government. Unpublished Manuscript.

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4 Violência política

- Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. On Economic Causes of Civil War. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 50(4): 563–73.
- Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56(4): 563–95.
- Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *American Political Science Review*, 97(1): 75–90
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- Brückner, M., & Ciccone, A. (2011). Rain and the democratic window of opportunity. *Econometrica*, 79(3), 923-947.

5 Como o sistema eleitoral afeta política pública

5.1 Eleições majoritárias vs proporcionais

- Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2004), “Constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes”, *American Economic Review*, 94, pp. 25-46.
- Funk, Patricia, and Christina Gathmann. ”How do electoral systems affect fiscal policy? Evidence from cantonal parliaments, 1890–2000.” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 11.5 (2013): 1178-1203.
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5.2 Democracia direta vs democracia representativa

- Matsusaka, J.G. (1995), “Fiscal effects of the voter initiative: evidence from the last 30 Years”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 103, pp. 587-623.
- Funk, Patricia and Christina Gathmann (2010), “Does Direct Democracy reduce the Size of Government? New Evidence from Historical Data, 1890-2000”, *Economic Journal*, 91, pp. 2261–2290.
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5.3 Organização legislativa

- Baqir, Reza (2002), “Districting and Government Overspending”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 110.
- Egger, Peter and Marko Koethenbueger (2010), “Government Spending and Legislative Organization: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Germany”, *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 2, pp. 200-212.
- de Melo Castro, Carlos Renato & Christian Lehmann (2014) *Gasto Público e Organização Legislativa: Evidência da Lei 1/n para o Brasil*. ANPEC 2014

5.4 Democracia vs. Ditadura

- BARRO, R. J. (1996). *Democracy and Growth*. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 1, 1-27.

6 Falhas de mercado vs. falhas de Governo

6.1 Falhas de mercado

- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and J. Robinson (2001), “The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation”, *American Economic Review*, 91, pp.1369-1401
- Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (2004), “Do Institutions Cause Growth?”, *Journal of Economic Growth*, 9, pp. 271-303.
- Dell, M. (2010). The persistent effects of Peru’s mining mita. *Econometrica*, 78(6), 1863-1903.
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- Dave Donaldson (2018). *Railroads of the Raj: Estimating the Impact of Transportation Infrastructure*, *American Economic Review*.
- Duflo, E., and Pande, R. (2007). Dams. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(2), 601-646.
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- Draca, M., Machin, S., and Witt, R. (2011). Panic on the streets of london: Police, crime, and the july 2005 terror attacks. *American Economic Review*, 101(5), 2157-81.
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- Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001). Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. *Economics Letters*
- Alesina, A., Baqir, R., and Easterly, W. (1999). Public goods and ethnic divisions. *The Quarterly journal of economics*
- Beach, B., and Jones, D. B. (2017). Gridlock: Ethnic diversity in government and the provision of public goods. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*
- Fehr, E., & Leibbrandt, A. (2011). A field study on cooperativeness and impatience in the tragedy of the commons. *Journal of Public Economics*, 95(9-10), 1144-1155.
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- La Porta, R., & López-de-Silanes, F. (1999). The Benefits of Privatization: Evidence from Mexico. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1193-1242.
- Galiani, S., Gertler, P., & Schargrodsky, E. (2005). Water for life: The impact of the privatization of water services on child mortality. *Journal of political economy*, 113(1), 83-120.
- McKenzie, D., Mookherjee, D., Castañeda, G., & Saavedra, J. (2003). The distributive impact of privatization in Latin America: Evidence from four countries. *Economia*, 3(2), 161-233
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- Muralidharan, K., & Sundararaman, V. (2015). The Aggregate Effect of School Choice: Evidence from a Two-Stage Experiment in India. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 130(3), 1011-1066.
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- Olken, B. A., “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia,” *Journal of Political Economy* 115(2) (2007), 200–249.
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- Ferraz, C., Finan, F., & Moreira, D. B. (2012). Corrupting learning: Evidence from missing federal education funds in Brazil. *Journal of Public Economics*, 96(9), 712-726.
- Prakash, N., Rockmore, M., and Uppal, Y. (2019). Do criminally accused politicians affect economic outcomes? Evidence from India. *Journal of Development Economics*, 141, 102370.
- DREHER, A.; GASSEBNER, M. Greasing the wheels? the impact of regulations and corruption on firm entry. *Public Choice*, Springer, p. 1–20, 2013.
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7 Políticas redistributivas

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- Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Cynthia Kinnan. 2015. "The Miracle of Microfinance? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 7(1): 22-53.
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8 Tributação e relações inter-governamentais

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